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Commentary 
Regulatory Regimes and State Cost 
Containment Programs 
Robert  B. Hackey 
Rhode Island Department of Health 
Kenneth Thorpe’s analysis of trends in health care spending in Canada and 
the United States, which appears in this issue ofJHPPL, raises several im- 
portant questions about state health care regulation. Thorpe demonstrates 
that it is possible to contain costs in the context of a decentralized multi- 
payer system of provider reimbursement, and he cites several U. S . states 
that were as effective in controlling costs over the past decade as Canadian 
provinces operating under a single-payer framework. Although Thorpe 
argues that “expenditure containment and growth ultimately reflect the 
outcomes of political bargaining among providers and payers ,” he does 
not specify the form these bargaining processes have taken or what their 
impact has been on states’ ability to control hospital costs over the past 
decade. In the end, Thorpe’s analysis leaves us with more questions than 
it answers. In particular, how can we account for significant differences in 
hospital expenditures between states with similar reimbursement method- 
ologies? Under what circumstances are state governments able to control 
hospital costs effectively? And what lessons can state experiences with 
hospital regulation teach us about national health care reform? 
The design of regulatory institutions, the policy preferences and eco- 
nomic interests of public and private decision makers, and the ability of 
public officials to modify providers’ behavior all influence the effective- 
ness of state cost containment programs. The interaction between public 
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officials and health providers reflects the larger relationship between state 
government and the private sector, since the development and implemen- 
tation of hospital reimbursement policies occur in the context of a state’s 
prevailing cultural and institutional setting. Because both political cul- 
ture and the autonomy and capacity of political institutions vary from 
state to state, different regulatory outcomes (e.g . , successfully control- 
ling hospital costs) should emerge from different policy environments. In 
this context, the autonomy, capacity, and legitimacy of state regulation 
is often as important, if not more so, as the adoption of a particular re- 
imbursement methodology in determining the success or failure of its cost 
containment initiatives (Hackey 1992). 
The institutional and ideological Setting of 
State Hospital Regulation 
Several features of a state’s policy-making environment influence the de- 
velopment of hospital reimbursement policies. First, the policy-making 
capacity of political institutions responsible for the development and im- 
plementation of rate setting has an immediate impact on a state’s ability 
to control hospital expenditures. A state’s level of institutional capacity 
depends on stable (and adequate) budgetary and political support, the rate 
of personnel turnover, and the professionalism and expertise of regulatory 
policymakers. Second, if the governmental actors in the reimbursement 
process share a sense of mission, it improves a state’s ability to control 
health care costs; if they do not agree over either the means or the ends 
of regulation, industry groups can play legislators, bureaucrats, and other 
participants off against each other in the hope of improving their bar- 
gaining position. Finally, when public officials can implement policies 
that run contrary to the preferences of powerful societal interests, state 
hospital cost containment efforts can be more effective. In states where 
policymakers lack either the autonomy or the authority to act against the 
preferences of provider groups, policy outcomes will resemble what hap- 
pens with interest group liberalism (Lowi 1969) and regulatory “capture” 
(Stigler 1988; McConnell 1966), in which narrowly defined economic 
interests dominate the reimbursement process. 
The legitimacy of state cost containment efforts has a powerful im- 
pact on the behavior of interest groups in the policy process. When state 
intervention in the hospital sector is seen as entirely legitimate, legal 
and legislative challenges to the regulatory system will be infrequent and 
less likely to succeed when they appear. Differences in the influence of 
public officials and providers also reflect variations in political culture 
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from state to state, because the role, authority, and autonomy of political 
institutions are shaped by a state’s prevailing political culture and tradi- 
tions. In general, the more conservative states will be less receptive to 
government-sponsored solutions such as rate regulation that infringe on 
the decision-making powers of individuals and firms. 
Regulatory Regimes and the Politics of 
Hospital Reimbursement 
The relationship between state governments and the hospital industry falls 
into three distinct patterns, or regimes, which are biased either in favor 
of, or against, the development of effective regulatory policies to control 
hospital costs (Hackey 1992). Each regime represents a fundamentally 
different balance between the “relative bargaining strengths of purchasers 
and providers” (see Thorpe in this issue). At one extreme are the imposed 
regimes, which are defined by an extreme centralization of state regula- 
tory powers, where public officials possess the authority to reshape the 
hospital reimbursement process to further the state’s interests. In contrast, 
market regimes are notable for the relative underdevelopment of state 
regulatory authority and a hesitance on the part of policymakers to use the 
few powers granted to them. In states where regulation and traditional pat- 
terns of provider dominance remain in conflict, hospital reimbursement 
policy is governed by a negotiated regime. 
Imposed Regimes 
Under an imposed regulatory regime, the belief that the state has a legiti- 
mate role in regulating hospital reimbursement fosters an environment in 
which cost control initiatives can be successfully developed and imple- 
mented. Political support from the executive branch and the legislature 
also gives state officials more leverage with industry groups. Imposed 
regimes are highly institutionalized: low turnover among bureaucratic 
and legislative personnel responsible for health care reimbursement issues 
contributes to the development of specialized knowledge and a shared 
commitment to controlling health care costs.’ For a state’s hospital regu- 
latory policies to be classified as an imposed regime, however, public 
1. See, for example, Wilson’s (1989: 95-1 10) discussion of the impact of a cohesive orga- 
nizational mission on the performance of the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, and the Social Security Administration and Perrow’s (1990) account of the effect of 
goal conflict and goal displacement on New York’s response to the emerging AIDS epidemic 
during the 1980s. 
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officials must possess a well-defined set of policy preferences that they 
are able to implement consistently as public policy. 
Market Regimes 
The relationship between providers, payers, and the state is fundamen- 
tally different under a market regime, where public officials possess little 
or no formal authority to regulate the hospital industry. Under these cir- 
cumstances, regulatory agencies are unlikely to be catalysts of change, 
for the prevailing political culture favors private solutions to public prob- 
lems, in the spirit of Grant McConnell’s (1966) “orthodox tradition” as 
both a more efficient and less threatening solution than state intervention. 
Consensus on ideological and programmatic goals among participants and 
relevant publics in the health policy network is typically high, for the 
state imposes few requirements on either providers or payers; responsi- 
bility for negotiating reimbursement rates rests squarely with the private 
sector. A stunted bureaucracy also limits the state’s ability to develop 
and implement innovative cost control policies, because both “managed 
competition” and rate-setting strategies typically require that government 
officials assume an activist role (Morone 1992). 
Negotiated Regimes 
The most common policy-making arrangements, however, fall some- 
where between these two extremes, where the ability of public officials to 
change providers’ behavior is limited by both institutional and ideologi- 
cal constraints. Under a negotiated regime, state efforts to control costs 
are often hampered by high personnel turnover, conflict over program 
goals, inadequate funding for state regulatory agencies, and ideological 
resistance to regulatory initiatives. Policy development and implementa- 
tion has a strong corporatist flavor, as state officials must turn to industry 
groups for both political support and administrative assistance. Nego- 
tiated regimes thus reaffirm Huntington’s (1968: 5) contention that the 
“primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political 
institutions behind social and economic change .” 
The framework outlined above can shed some light on the questions 
posed by Thorpe’s analysis, because the hospital reimbursement decisions 
that he discusses in California, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
and New York occurred in the context of either imposed or negotiated 
regimes. In each state, government officials adopted an activist role in 
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the hospital reimbursement process, either by creating an all-payer rate- 
setting system or by designing an elaborate system of competitive bidding 
for health services (e.g., Medi-Cal). In the pages that follow, I explore the 
impact of differences in political culture and institutional arrangements 
on cost containment in two of those states, Massachusetts and New York, 
over the past decade. 
New York 
New York’s experience with hospital rate setting can best be understood 
as an imposed regulatory regime. In no state was the “public utility’’ 
model of rate regulation more conspicuous than in the Empire State; by 
the early 1980s, the hospital industry had lost much of its capacity for 
autonomous decision making. While the state’s initial forays into hospital 
rate regulation in the 1970s only set rates for Blue Cross and Medicaid, 
the scope of state regulatory authority gradually expanded to include all 
payers with the creation of the New York Prospective Hospital Reimburse- 
ment Methodology (NYPHRM) in 1982. When New York declined to 
renew its Medicare waiver after the expiration of NYPHRM I in 1985, 
subsequent versions of the state’s prospective payment system operated 
as a “Medicare wraparound,” setting rates for all non-Medicare payers. 
Although the state’s fiscal crisis during the 1970s provided the impetus 
for officials in the Department of Health (DOH) to engage in increasingly 
aggressive efforts to control the growth of hospital costs, the enormous 
expense of Medicaid insured that hospital cost control remained a policy 
priority. New York’s fiscal obligation to Medicaid is staggering; through- 
out the 1980s’ the Empire State led the nation in total Medicaid program 
expenses, per capita Medicaid spending, and the number of Medicaid re- 
cipients as a percentage of the state’s population. The fiscal burden of 
Medicaid helped to forge a broad consensus among public and private 
payers over the importance of bringing hospital costs under control; with 
strong support from both the governor’s office and the legislature over the 
past decade, officials in the Department of Health presided over a regula- 
tory apparatus that presented hospitals with one of the most competitive, 
if not openly hostile, operating environments in the nation. 
New York has a long tradition of regulatory activism in the health sec- 
tor, dating back to the Metcalf-McClosky Act of 1964, which introduced 
one of the nation’s most stringent certificate-of-need programs to curtail 
hospitals’ capital expansion. Although providers have challenged both the 
Department of Health’s regulatory decisions and its rate-setting powers, 
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the department’s regulatory authority has generally been upheld in court. 
The Hospital Association of New York State has vociferously opposed the 
state’s reimbursement policies and has often found a receptive ear in 
the legislature, but endorsements from Blue Cross, business groups, and 
the governor’s office generally supported the DOH’s aggressive pursuit 
of cost control over the opposition of the hospital industry.2 During the 
1980s, the relationship between the state’s hospital industry and the de- 
partment reflect a level of animosity seldom seen in American politics. 
While hospitals fumed over the Department of Health’s “micromanage- 
ment” of provider reimbursement and the lack of turnover among senior 
managers in the DOH, Commissioner Axelrod compared the state’s hos- 
pitals to “seventeenth-century Germanic guilds” in speeches to the state’s 
business community. Under these circumstances, as one hospital execu- 
tive quipped, “it’s tough to get people to be statesmanlike.” By the end 
of the decade, the department had forced hospitals to shoulder the brunt 
of the cost for implementing new minimum operating standards, thwarted 
repeated efforts by providers to move the base year for calculating re- 
imbursement rates, and successfully managed the transition from a per 
diem reimbursement methodology to a new case-based payment system 
using diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Even after the unexpected retire- 
ment of Commissioner David Axelrod in 1991, the Department of Health 
remained firmly committed to controlling hospital costs. 
The ability of policymakers over the past decade to resist industry pres- 
sures and persist in their efforts to keep hospital costs under control re- 
flected the capacity of New York’s policy-making institutions in the health 
sector. In particular, the institutionalization of expertise within both the 
DOH and the legislature’s principal incubator for health policy devel- 
opment, the Council on Health Care Financing, provided state officials 
with a crucial advantage in reimbursement negotiations. While providers 
criticized low turnover in key policy positions within the Department of 
Health, the presence of a highly professionalized and experienced staff 
enabled the state to develop and implement innovative regulatory policies 
2. In 1990, however, neither the governor nor the legislature was predisposed to wage a 
protracted battle over hospital costs because of the upcoming statewide election. Instead, the 
reenactment of the state’s case payment system became an opportunity to appease powerful 
constituencies. The legislature rejected the DOH’s proposal to pay providers on the basis of a 
“group price,” where institutions’ level of reimbursement is based on the average costs for a 
group of peer institutions rather than their own historical experience and pumped more than $300 
million in additional revenues into the hospital reimbursement system over a three-year period. 
This decision, however, was unusual, and stands in marked contrast to the policies adopted by 
the legislature and implemented by the Department of Health in previous years. 
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Table 1 Personnel Stability under an imposed Regulatory Regime, New 
York State Department of Health, Office of Health Systems 
Management, 1991 
~~ 
Name Position Appointed Previous Departmental Experience 
Raymond Sweeney Director 
Brian Hendricks Executive 
deputy 
director 
Steve Anderman Deputy 
director, 
DHCF 
Mark Van Guysling Assistant 
director, 
DHCF 
William Gormley Deputy 
director, 
DHFP 
Nicholas Mangiordo Deputy 
director, 
ALTCS 
Michael Parker Associate 
director, 
CON 
1984 
1984 
1982 
1982 
1989 
1989 
1979 
Executive deputy director (198 1- 
83); associate director, DHCF 
(1979-81) 
Governor’s Select Commission 
(1983-84); deputy director, 
Health Planning Commission 
(1 979-83) 
Assistant director, DHCF 
(1 979-82) 
Assistant director, Bureau of 
Hospital Reimbursement, DHCF 
(1 978-82) 
Assistant director, DHCF 
( 1979-88) 
Deputy director, DHFP (1979-89) 
Director, Bureau of Facility and 
Service Review, DHFP (1976-78) 
Note. DHCF: Division of Health Care Financing; DHFP: Division of Health Facility Planning; 
ALTCS: Alternative Long Term Care Strategies; CON: Certificate of Need Review Group, DHFP. 
over the past decade (see Table 1). During the 1980s, New York led the 
nation in developing new DRG classifications for neonatal conditions and 
AIDS, significantly improved its DRG grouper in 1990, and began plan- 
ning for improvements to be incorporated into the latest version of the 
state’s case-based payment system (NYPHRM IV). In short, the techni- 
cal sophistication and policy expertise of New York’s health bureaucracy 
enabled it to respond to a changing environment by setting the state’s 
policy agenda. In other states, however, state rate-setting programs were 
less dynamic and were unable to respond to new demands and pressures. 
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Massachusetts 
Massachusetts’s experience with rate regulation illustrates the perils of 
regulatory policy-making in an unstable political environment. Less than 
a decade after the introduction of all-payer rate setting, hospital rate 
regulation self-destructed and was effectively discredited as a cost con- 
trol strategy in the eyes of payers, providers, and former legislative sup- 
porters. In 1991, the Weld administration’s proposal to deregulate the 
reimbursement system passed comfortably in both the House and the 
Senate, effectively ending the state’s foray into hospital regulation. Few 
mourned its passage. The demise of rate setting in Massachusetts presents 
a puzzle: Why did Massachusetts and New York have such different ex- 
periences with all-payer rate setting, despite the similarities between their 
reimbursement methodologies? Furthermore, what led Massachusetts to 
turn its back on regulation scarcely a decade after it came to national 
prominence? 
Although the state’s authority to regulate hospital reimbursement ex- 
panded considerably over time, support for regulation in Massachusetts 
depended on a fragile coalition of payers, providers, and business groups 
brought together to support the state’s first all-payer system (Chapter 372) 
in 1982 (see Bergthold 1988). After the passage of Chapter 372, the 
Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission (MRSC) took a less active role 
in policy development as the locus of decision-making authority shifted 
to the legislature. In sharp contrast to New York, the institution with 
the most experience regulating health providers was relegated to a mar- 
ginal role, since subsequent reenactments of the all-payer system in 1985 
(Chapter 574) and 1988 (Chapter 23) actually specified the terms of the 
contracts between providers and payers. In the legislative arena, however, 
hospital reimbursement soon fell victim to the vagaries of the political 
process as payers, providers, and business groups pursued their own nar- 
row economic interests. 
The origins of all-payer rate setting in Massachusetts also constrained 
the state’s ability to implement policies opposed by powerful societal 
groups. The state was a reluctant participant in the process which pro- 
duced Chapter 372; legislators simply ratified an agreement hammered 
out under the prodding of the state business community, led by the Mas- 
sachusetts Business Roundtable (MBRT) (Bergthold 1988). Chapter 372 
reflected the concerns of the state’s business community that hospital 
costs were spiraling out of control. The all-payer system provided hos- 
pitals with a strong incentive to cut operating costs, control admissions, 
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and shift patient care to less expensive, outpatient settings when it linked 
reimbursement to patient volume and imposed new “productivity” in- 
centives on hospitals. Business supported both Chapter 372 and its suc- 
cessor, Chapter 574, as a welcome step toward cost reduction. When 
the all-payer system came up for renewal in 1988, however, the political 
environment had changed. Hospitals demanded a relaxation of the strict 
productivity requirements and sought additional funding to offset rising 
labor costs for nurses and other allied health personnel in exchange for 
their support of the Dukakis administration’s health care reform agenda. 
In the end, the passage of the universal health care bill (Chapter 23) was 
a watershed for rate regulation in Massachusetts: its generous treatment 
of providers was a bane to business groups and a boon to providers. 
The coalition that had framed Chapter 372 collapsed after the passage of 
Chapter 23. After losing badly in the legislative debates in 1988, business 
effectively withdrew from health policy debates to pursue other issues, 
such as worker’s compensation and tax reform. 
Blue Cross, for its part, felt increasingly constrained because the regu- 
latory framework embodied in Chapter 23 prevented the company from 
flexing its muscle in a more competitive bidding process. By 1988, the 
state’s cumbersome proto-DRG system appeared anachronistic and in- 
flexible to providers and payers alike. High personnel turnover and budget 
cutbacks, however, prevented the MRSC from either improving the sys- 
tem or developing a worthy successor; with few resources, the MRSC was 
overwhelmed with the day-to-day administration of the payment system. 
Staff cutbacks, a statewide hiring freeze, and the attractiveness of oppor- 
tunities in the private sector drained the MRSC of several of its most tal- 
ented managers; leadership of the MRSC’s Bureau of Hospitals changed 
hands four times between 1985 and 1990, while other key positions re- 
mained unfilled. The arrival of the Weld administration in 1990 sealed the 
fate of rate setting, for the governor and his staff sought to eliminate, not 
enhance, the MRSC’s regulatory authority as part of a general campaign 
to “downsize” state government. 
Massachusetts’s experience in controlling costs during the 1980s re- 
flects the turmoil and instability of a changing political environment. The 
state was more effective in controlling the growth of hospital expendi- 
tures in the early years of the all-payer system, when the various parties 
shared a consensus on both goals and means. As this consensus began 
to fray in the mid-l980s, the legislature made significant concessions to 
the hospital industry in order to win reauthorization of the reimbursement 
system, undermining the system’s ability to control costs. From 1982 to 
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1986, hospital expenditures in Massachusetts increased, on average, at 
slightly more than a 7 percent annual rate, reflecting the stringency of 
the new cost control mechanisms introduced by Chapter 372. After 1986, 
however, the Bay State was much less successful in controlling costs, as 
annual increases in hospital costs nearly doubled, averaging more than 
12 percent from 1987 to 1989. Although Medicaid placed a heavy bur- 
den on both Massachusetts and New York, the stringency of NYPHRM’s 
all-payer reimbursement methodology successfully limited the growth in 
program outlays. In New York, Medicaid expenses increased 147 per- 
cent from 1975 to 1988, compared to a whopping 332 percent increase 
during the same period in Massachusetts (HCFA 1988). While hospital 
expenditures increased in all of the states described in Table 2, the rate of 
growth in Massachusetts and New Jersey far exceeded that in New York, 
where strong political support and an experienced policy-making team 
continued to campaign for cost control at the end of the decade. 
Conclusion 
In the end, state efforts to control hospital costs have much to teach 
policymakers about national health care reform. More than three decades 
after rising health care costs first became an issue of public concern, 
policymakers and the public continue to search for a “quick fix” to the 
nation’s health care dilemma. Too often, our search for solutions begins, 
and ends, with various methods for reorganizing the health care system 
(such as HMOs), reforming provider payment (DRGs), or rationalizing 
the production of health services (HSAs, PSROs, and PROS). Thorpe’s 
analysis, however, suggests that no single reimbursement methodology, 
in and of itself, holds the key to controlling health care costs. Instead, 
the problem is a political one, linked to the peculiar institutional and 
ideological context of American health policy. 
Successful cost control, therefore, depends not on whether providers 
are reimbursed by a single payer or multiple payers, paid prospectively 
or retrospectively, or whether reimbursement is computed on a per diem, 
per case, or global budget basis. As Foster (1982) notes, the rate of re- 
imbursement can be set at a high or low level under any payment meth- 
odology. Cost control is inextricably linked to the capacity and autonomy 
of regulatory institutions, for without adequate authority and expertise, 
government will be hard pressed to design and implement an effective 
health care financing system. The experiences of Massachusetts and New 
York over the past decade also lend credence to Sapolsky et al.’s (1987: 
135) observation that “it is less difficult to bring together a talented group 
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for designing a new program than it is to hold one together for the ardu- 
ous task of program implementation and refinement .” Decentralizing cost 
control responsibilities is desirable, because it would permit continued 
experimentation with various methods of organizing and financing health 
care services, despite the states’ inability to significantly improve access 
to health services (see Stone 1992). Any proposal for national health care 
reform which leaves policy implementation in the hands of the states, 
however, is likely to require institution building, for not all states pos- 
sess the institutional leverage to negotiate effectively with providers and 
payers. If a decentralized strategy is to succeed, the federal government 
must be willing to bolster the states’ regulatory capabilities; without tech- 
nical expertise and a clear mandate to control costs, neither state nor 
federal efforts are likely to reduce health care expenditures significantly in 
the years to come. 
References 
American Hospital Association. 1982-89. Annual surveys of U.S. hospitals. New 
York: American Hospital Association. 
Bergthold, Linda A. 1988. Purchasing Power: Business and Health Policy Change in 
Massachusetts. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 13 : 425-5 1 . 
Foster, Richard W. 1982. Cost-based Reimbursement and Prospective Payment: Re- 
assessing the Incentives. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 7 :407-20. 
Hackey, Robert B. 1992. Trapped between State and Market: Regulating Hospital 
Reimbursement in the Northeastern States. Medical Care Review 49 (3) :  355-88. 
HCFA (Health Care Financing Administration). 1988. Medicare and Medicaid Data 
Book. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Lowi, Theodore. 1969. The End of Liberalism. New York: Norton. 
McConnell, Grant. 1966. Private Power and American Democracy. New York: Knopf. 
Morone, James A. 1992. Hidden Complications: Why Health Care Needs Regulation. 
Perrow, Charles. 1990. The AIDS Disaster. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Sapolsky, Harvey, James Aisenberg, and James A. Morone. 1987. The Call to Rome 
and Other Obstacles to State-Level Innovation. Public Administration Review 47 
(March/ April): 135-42. 
Stigler, George. 1988. The Theory of Economic Regulation. In Chicago Studies in 
Political Economy, ed. G. Stigler. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They 
Doit .  New York: Basic. 
American Prospect 10 (Summer): 40-48. 
